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BARRY, 
 Jeremy Noyes was charged in a four-count indictment with the transportation, 
receipt, and possession of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor and the 
transportation of obscene matter.  He was convicted on all counts following a five-day 
jury trial at which he represented himself, and was sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment, 
the statutory maximum.  He now appeals, arguing that his waiver of counsel was not 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; that a five-level enhancement to his offense level 
under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 should not have been applied; and that his sentence was 
substantively as well as procedurally unreasonable.   We will affirm.   
Circuit Judge 
I.   
 Because we write only for the parties, who are fully familiar with this case, we will 
move directly to the issues before us.  On September 9, 2008, a grand jury sitting in the 
 3 
Western District of Pennsylvania returned a four-count indictment charging Noyes with 
transportation of child pornography (Count One), receipt of child pornography (Count 
Two), and possession of child pornography (Count Three), all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252, as well as transportation of obscene matter (Count Four), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1462.  Noyes rejected a plea offer, electing to proceed to trial. 
 On the morning that trial was to begin, Noyes entered the courtroom and presented 
a handwritten note to his court-appointed attorney, Michael Hadley, Esq. (“Hadley”), 
stating that he wished to proceed pro se.  Thereafter, the District Court conducted an 
extensive colloquy with Noyes during which it thoroughly explained, among other things, 
the numerous risks in proceeding pro se, the numerous advantages of being represented by 
counsel, and the maximum penalties he was facing, and urged him to reconsider.  Noyes 
confirmed time and again that he wished to represent himself.  Ultimately, after Noyes 
stated that he was “absolutely certain” that he wished to represent himself and that he 
didn’t see a need “to waste any more of the jury’s time” (J.A. 59), the District Court 
permitted him to do so, with Hadley to serve as stand-by counsel.  The jury returned a 
guilty verdict on all four counts after little more than one hour of deliberations.    
 A sentencing hearing was held on June 23, 2011.  Noyes assured the District Court 
that he wished to continue to represent himself, and the Court permitted him to do so after 
another colloquy regarding the risks of proceeding without counsel.  At the sentencing 
hearing, the Court ruled on the various objections to the presentence report (“PSR”), and 
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determined, as had the PSR, that the guideline range was 360 months to life, although the 
statutory maximum capped the potential sentence at 45 years.  The Court imposed the 
statutory maximum sentence and explained why it did so.  This appeal followed.   
III.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  Our 
review of Noyes’s claim that the District Court’s determination that his waiver of his right 
to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent is plenary.  United States v. Stubbs, 
281 F.3d 109, 113 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002).  We review for plain error Noyes’s challenge to the 
procedural reasonableness of his sentence and the five-level enhancement, neither of 
which was challenged before the District Court.  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 
467 (1997).   Our review of the substantive reasonableness challenge to his within-
guidelines sentence is highly deferential, and we will affirm the sentence “unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on [Noyes] for the 
reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc).    
A.  Waiver of Right to Counsel      
 It is well-established that the Sixth Amendment protects both a defendant’s right to 
the assistance of counsel and his right to refuse counsel and proceed pro se.   Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975).  “A defendant who wishes to represent himself 
‘must be allowed to make that choice, even if it works ultimately to his own detriment.’”  
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United States v. Jones, 452 F.3d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  Before 
permitting a defendant to proceed pro se, however, “the trial court [bears] the weighty 
responsibility of conducting a sufficiently penetrating inquiry to satisfy itself that the 
defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing and understanding as well as voluntary.”  
United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2002).  In order for a waiver of 
counsel to be considered knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a district court must 
establish that the defendant: (1) has “clearly and unequivocally” expressed his desire to 
proceed pro se; (2) “understands the nature of the charges, the range of possible 
punishments, potential defenses, technical problems that [he] may encounter, and any 
other facts important to a general understanding of the risks involved”; and (3) is 
competent to stand trial.  Id. at 131, 132, 134. 
In Peppers, we set out a number of model questions to serve as a guide to the 
district court in performing this inquiry.  Id. at 136-37.  There is no “scripted recital” or 
“talismanic formula” for this colloquy, Jones, 452 F.3d at 229, 234, but “if it appears that 
the defendant needs further explanation, or it is evident that the defendant does not 
comprehend what the court is saying or asking, the court will need to probe further.”  
Peppers, 302 F.3d at 137; see also Jones, 452 F.3d at 234 n.8 (observing that the district 
court must “probe . . . more deeply” or “follow up on questions to which [the defendant 
gives] ambivalent or tentative answers”).   
 Although purporting to do so, Noyes, who, we note, was studying medicine at the 
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time of his arrest, does not seriously argue, nor could he given this record, that his waiver 
of counsel was not knowing or intelligent or voluntary.  His argument is more nuanced 
than that, and is bottomed on the fact, and fact it be, that when, during the extensive 
colloquy conducted by the District Court, he gave strange if not nonsensical answers to, at 
most, a few of the Court’s questions, the Court should have but did not probe further to 
assure itself that he was competent to waive counsel.  In support of our observation that 
his argument is “nuanced,” Noyes does not argue that he was not competent to waive 
counsel and proceed pro se, but only that the Court’s failure to follow up on those 
answers invalidates the waiver.   
 It is, of course, well-established that “[i]n order for a waiver of the right to counsel 
to be valid, the court must first assure itself that the defendant is competent to waive the 
right.”  Gov’t of the V.I. v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 404 (3d Cir. 1995).  The question of 
competency “does not test one’s legal competency to represent oneself.”  Peppers, 302 
F.3d at 132 n.11.  Rather, the degree of competency necessary to waive the right to 
counsel generally is viewed as being the same as the competency necessary to stand trial.  
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (stating that the standard is whether a defendant 
“has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him”) (citation omitted).  In evaluating competency, “a mere routine 
inquiry . . . may leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to an informed 
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decision that an accused has executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel.”  Von Moltke 
v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).  Accordingly, a trial court should be mindful of its 
duty to “probe . . . more deeply” or “follow up” if the defendant’s responses to 
questioning raise a doubt as to his ability to make a valid waiver of counsel.  Jones, 452 
F.3d at 234 n.8.  Of course, a court need not “make a competency determination in every 
case in which a defendant seeks . . . to waive his right to counsel.”  Godinez v. Moran, 
509 U.S. 389, 401 n.13 (1993).  However, “a competency determination is necessary . . . 
when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence.”  Id. 
The District Court could, and, in an ideal world, perhaps should, have followed up 
with additional questions when Noyes gave his few strange answers.  However, there is 
nothing else in this record that would or should have caused the Court, or causes us, to 
doubt that Noyes was competent to waive his right to counsel.1
B.  Enhancement Under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2
  We will not invalidate 
that waiver.   
2
Noyes argues that the District Court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), 
 
                                                 
1 Although not directly relevant to the determination of Noyes’s competency at the time 
he waived his right to counsel, we note that his then-competence was borne out by his 
performance at trial, at which he cross-examined the government witnesses with relevant 
questions, moved for a judgment of acquittal, and conducted direct examination of his 
own witnesses.    
2 We reject Noyes’s claim that the District Court committed procedural error by not 
discussing rehabilitation.  A sentencing court is not, of course, required to rigidly adhere 
to a script or mechanically check off each of the § 3553(a) factors.  In any event, although 
the Court did not explicitly discuss rehabilitation, it surely had that in mind when it found 
that Noyes was “not capable of being deterred.”  (J.A. 855).     
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which provides for a 5-level increase if the offense involved “[d]istribution for the 
receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain.”  The 
commentary defines this standard to mean:  
any transaction, including bartering or other in-kind transaction, that is 
conducted for a thing of value, but not for profit. “Thing of value” means 
anything of valuable consideration.  For example, in a case involving the 
bartering of child pornographic material, the “thing of value” is the child 
pornographic material received in exchange for other child pornographic 
material bartered in consideration for the material received. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, cmt. n.1.   
 The enhancement was applied based on a series of e-mails and online chats 
between Noyes and an individual using the e-mail address julliettehodge@gmail.com
 A purely gratuitous distribution of child pornography would not warrant the 
application of this enhancement, even if additional pornographic images were later 
received by the defendant.  Here, however, the chat transcripts make clear that Noyes 
shared child pornography with Julliette with the conscious object of receiving additional 
 
(“Julliette”).  On appeal, Noyes does not dispute that he distributed images of child 
pornography to Juliette during their chats and that he received images of child 
pornography.  He contends, however, that the enhancement requires the government to 
prove that his conscious purpose or object in distributing the pornography was to receive 
other pornography from Julliette in return, and he asserts that “[n]owhere in those emails 
or chat transcripts is there any evidence of consideration or expectation, or that the emails 
were sent by either party on condition of a quid pro quo.”  (Appellant’s Br. 17).   
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pornography in return.  This quid pro quo arrangement, of the sort contemplated by the 
enhancement, is demonstrated by the following chat transcript, which took place while 
Noyes and Julliette were simultaneously exchanging e-mails containing images of child 
pornography:  
me:3
Julliette: look in your email 
  yes I got the two 
me:  more? 
me:  nice 
Julliette: Oke….:) 
me: to show you theres nothing to be ashamed of ;) 
me:  here Ill send you some 
me: :) 
me:  I was encrypting them 
. . . .  
me: ok thats just a sample 
Julliette:  yes yes yes 
me: do you like? 
Julliette: baby!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
me: ok I sent you some ;) 
Julliette: got it 
. . . . 
me: or did you send me more? 
me: you want me to send more? 
Julliette:  send some other 
me: I haven’t sent mine yet gimme a sec theres a lot 
Julliette:  yes 
me: you sent more? 
. . . .  
Julliette: ok 
me: got yours ;) 
. . . .  
me: and why do you keep going offline 
me: lil girls should be fair 
me: since I sent so much :-p 
me:  can you send? 
                                                 
3 In these chats, “me” refers to Noyes.  Typographical errors have not been corrected. 
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Julliette: I have more 
. . . .  
me: thank you thank you thank you 
me: ooooo more 
. . . .  
Julliette:  does it make u happy? 
Julliette:  yes yes yes 
me:  SUCH A GOOD GIRL. 
me: more you sent more 
Julliette: ok 
me:  that’s all I ask 
 
 As evidenced by this transcript, Noyes distributed pornographic images from his 
own collection with the expectation of receiving images in return from Julliette.  Indeed, 
at one point Noyes makes the understanding of reciprocity explicit, asking Julliette to be 
“fair” and send him more images “since [he] sent so much.”  The District Court’s 
application of a five-level enhancement under §2G2.2, to which Noyes did not object, 
was not plain error.    
C.  Substantive Reasonableness 
 Finally, Noyes argues that his 45-year sentence was substantively unreasonable.  
On appeal, the “substantive reasonableness inquiry must be highly deferential” because 
the “sentencing judge, not the court of appeals, is in a superior position to find facts and 
judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.”  United States v. Merced, 603 
F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010).  That surely is true in a case such as this where the 
experienced District Judge presided over a five-day trial; heard all of the overwhelming, 
damning evidence; and watched and listened as Noyes vigorously testified that he had 
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been framed.   
The sentence, a within-guidelines sentence, was undoubtedly harsh, but was not 
unreasonable.  The District Court recognized that Noyes had no prior convictions, but 
found his crimes here were “extremely serious.”  (J.A. 852).  It further found that Noyes 
demonstrated a “complete lack of remorse,” which was especially troubling “given the 
level of depravity exhibited by [him].”  (J.A. 855).  With respect to potential sentencing 
disparities between similarly situated defendants, the Court made quite clear that Noyes’s 
crimes were “so outrageously perverse and shocking as to be in a class of their own.”  
(Id.)  Finally, it emphasized that such a lengthy sentence was justified in the interests of 
general and specific deterrence.   
I do not think that I have ever seen a case where the sentencing goal of 
protection of the public figured more predominantly.  Anyone who sat 
through this trial would realize that this defendant is the worst nightmare of 
every child’s parent.  The entirely credible and overwhelming evidence 
demonstrated that the defendant is a dangerous predatory sadist, who took 
pleasure in viewing the abuse of children and who was fully prepared to do 
so himself if given the opportunity.  
 
 
(J.A. 854-55).4
                                                 
4 Noyes’s argument that the District Court overstated the need to protect the public from 
him is without merit.  The evidence presented at trial depicted Noyes’s long-term goals 
for propagating “quality blood lines” by attempting to impregnate women and young girls 
beginning at the age of eight.  Although Noyes had no history of contact offenses with 
minors, the evidence directly contradicts his assertion that he posed no danger to the 
public because his plans to sexually abuse small children were simply fantasies.  In an e-
mail describing plans for his sex slave society, Noyes explicitly stated, “This isn’t fantasy, 
and it is possible.”  (J.A. 276).  And in other conversations, he stated that because 
“[p]eople like us are hunted,” he is forced to solicit child pornography through 
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 The District Court’s conclusions and application of the § 3553(a) factors are amply 
supported by the record.  It surely cannot be said that the same sentence would not have 
been imposed, and for the same reasons, by any reasonable sentencing court.     
III.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
hypothetical stories.  That way, he explains, “I can later deny if someone says I’m sick 
etc. . . . I just say they’re fantasy stories.”  (J.A. 284).   
